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Abstract 
The passage of Proposition 26 in 2010 has left many wondering what 
the state of regulatory programs for environmental, public health, and safety 
in California will be moving forward.  Proposition 26 continues in the line of 
Propositions 13 and 218 to expand the definition of a “tax” to include some 
regulatory fees charged by the State. Any new tax in California requires a 
two-thirds vote by the Legislature for enactment.  The measure makes it 
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more difficult to impose charges on businesses and products to help offset 
the costs to public health or the environment as a result of their activities. 
In order not to be subject to a supermajority vote by the Legislature, the 
State would have to prove a special benefit conferred or privilege granted for 
those businesses.   
This note explores the impacts of Proposition 26 on the Global 
Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (“AB 32”), which mandates the California Air 
Resources Board to create a fee schedule to be paid by major emitters to 
fund projects to reduce emissions statewide.  It will look at the question of 
whether Proposition 26 can be applied retroactively to invalidate the fees 
and, going forward, whether any of the exceptions to Proposition 26 apply to 
AB 32 and how the California courts might interpret fees necessary to 
compensate the state for benefits conferred on industry alone.   
I. Introduction
California voters sent a mixed message on November 2, 2010,
simultaneously demonstrating their commitment to climate change 
mitigation, while making it harder to fund such efforts.  Proposition 23, 
which would have suspended the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 
32) until unemployment drops to 5.5 percent or less for four consecutive
quarters, was overwhelmingly defeated by 61.5 percent of the vote.2  (AB 32
imposes regulatory fees on major emitters to fund climate change
mitigation efforts.)  However, in the same election, voters passed
Proposition 26 with 52 percent of the vote to recategorize certain regulatory
fees as taxes, which would require a supermajority vote by the state
legislature to enact.3  While voters resoundingly showed support for climate
change mitigation proposed by AB 32, they may have restricted the funding
source for those same measures by requiring a higher threshold to pass
regulatory fees.
According to Richard M. Frank, Executive Director of the U.C. Berkeley 
School of Law’s Center for Law, Energy & the Environment, Proposition 26 
“fundamentally chang[es] [how] an increasingly large percentage of state 
and local government regulatory programs are financed.”4  The measure 
makes it much more difficult to enact statewide regulatory fees to fund 
public health, safety, and environmental protection programs by requiring 
they be authorized by a two-thirds, or supermajority, vote of the California 
2. The Statement of the Vote, Cal. Sec. of State (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.
sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2010-general/. 
3. Id.
4. Richard M. Frank, Proposition 26: California’s Stealth Initiative, The Daily Journal
(Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/9760.htm. 
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Legislature.5  Currently, these types of regulatory fees only require a simple 
majority to pass.6  Regulatory fees in the environmental context reflect the 
“polluter pays philosophy — the idea that those who pollute the 
environment to the detriment of public health and environmental resources 
should bear the costs of preventing and redressing such pollution.”7  
Since the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978 and Proposition 218 in 
1996, it has become increasingly difficult to impose new or increase taxes in 
California.8  Proposition 13 requires a two-thirds vote by the Legislature for 
any changes in state taxes enacted for the purpose of increasing revenue.9  
Proposition 218 requires local taxes to be passed by a two-thirds vote.10  
Before the passage of Proposition 26, however, California law recognized the 
distinction between taxes and regulatory fees, which only required a 
majority vote.11  In Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, (Sinclair) the 
California Supreme Court created the test for a valid fee, the key 
requirement being that it does not exceed the reasonable cost of providing 
services for which the fees are charged.12  As a result, the government can 
impose charges on some businesses and products in order to offset the 
public health or environmental impact of those activities.13  Because of the 
difficulty in raising new taxes, state and local governments increasingly rely 
on fee systems to fund regulatory programs.14 
Fee-funded regulatory programs include the system created by the 
passage of AB 32, which mandates the California Air Resources Board 
(“CARB”) to adopt fees to be assessed on greenhouse gas emitters to help 
fund efforts to reduce the amount of emissions in the state.15  The question 
among legal experts has become: “Will Proposition 26 make it difficult to 
enforce regulations under AB 32’s fee system?”16  Mary Nichols, Chair of 
CARB, recently stated, “Prop 26 does not impair the scoping plan adopted in 
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.  
8. Id.
9. Cal. Const., art. XIII A § 3(a).
10. Cal. Const. art. XIII D.
11. Cara Horowitz, Sean B. Hecht & M. Rhead Enion, Paying for Pollution:
Proposition 26 and its Potential Impacts on State Environmental and Public Health Protections in 
California, Univ. of Cal., Los Angeles, School of Law, http://www.vision.ca.gov 
/docs/Prop_26.pdf 
12. 15 Cal.4th 866, 876 (1997).
13. HOROWITZ ET AL., supra note 11, at 5.
14. Frank, supra note 4.
15. Id.
16. Siel Ju, Legal Experts Disagree on Prop 26’s Effect on AB 32, KPCC (Nov. 5, 2010),
http://www.scpr.org/blogs/environment/2010/11/05/legal-experts-disagree-whether 
prop-26-will-affect/.  
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2008 or any regulations developed under the plan.  AB 32 is on track . . .”17 
The purpose of this note is to explore what potential impacts the 
passage of Proposition 26 will have on the funding for AB 32.  Part I will 
examine the legal authority for establishing regulatory fees before the 
passage of Proposition 26 and how the initiative changes those 
requirements.  Part II will examine how CARB is currently assessing fees 
under AB 32 and how Proposition 26 could affect the fee program.  This 
section will explore whether Proposition 26 could be applied retroactively to 
invalidate the fee system adopted by CARB under AB 32.  Finally, Part III will 
explore whether any of the exceptions to Proposition 26 apply to AB 32 and 
how the California courts might interpret fee amounts necessary to 
compensate the state for benefits conferred on industry alone.   
II. The Legal Authority for Regulatory Fees
A. The Sinclair Paint Case
In Sinclair, the California Supreme Court held a regulatory free is not a 
tax, and therefore not subject to a supermajority vote required by 
Proposition 13.18  In 1991, by a simple majority vote, the state legislature 
enacted the Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Act (“Act”), which 
provided for evaluation, screening, and medically necessary follow-up 
services for children who suffered from lead poisoning.19  The programs were 
entirely supported by “fees” assessed on manufacturers or other persons 
significantly contributing to environmental lead contamination.20  The 
plaintiff, Sinclair Paint Company (“Sinclair”), challenged the validity of the 
fees on the grounds that they “were actually taxes imposed by the California 
Legislature in violation of Proposition 13,”21 and required a two-thirds 
majority vote to be valid.22  Sinclair argued the fee was a tax because it 
“neither reimburse[d] the state for special benefits conferred on 
manufacturers of lead-based products nor compensate[d] the state for 
governmental privileges granted to those manufacturers.”23 
In determining whether the fees assessed under the Act were in fact 
taxes, the California Supreme Court recognized three fee exceptions to 
Proposition 13: “(1) special assessments, based on the value of benefits 
17. Kristen Eberhard, Proposition 26 Will Not Stop AB 32, Natural Resources
Defense Council (Nov. 5, 2010), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/kgrenfell/ 
proposition_26_will_not_stop_a.html. 
18. 15 Cal. 4th at 876-77.
19. Id. at 869-70.
20. Id. at 870.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 875.
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conferred on the property; (2) development fees, exacted in return for 
permits or other government privileges; and (3) regulatory fees, imposed 
under police power.”24   
The Court recognized the fees were regulatory in nature because they 
impacted future conduct by manufacturers.25  The Court reasoned the fees 
would presumably deter further manufacturing, distribution, or sale of 
dangerous products, and would stimulate research and development of safer 
product alternatives.26  In other words, manufacturers would change their 
practices in order to reduce their fee payments.27 
Additionally, the Court recognized that the state’s authority is broad 
enough under its police powers to impose industry-wide mitigation fees for 
the adverse societal effects created by an industry.28  This includes 
“mandatory remedial measures to mitigate the past, present, or future 
adverse impact of the fee payer’s operation, at least where the measure 
requires a causal connection or nexus between the product and its adverse 
effects.”29  
Proposition 26’s “Findings and Declaration of Purpose” indicate the 
drafters’ concern that taxes are being disguised as fees that exceed the 
reasonable cost of regulation.30  However, Sinclair never stood for the 
proposition that fees can go beyond the harm they seek to mitigate.31  The 
Court specifically addressed this point when it said: “we observe that [the 
plaintiff], in moving for summary judgment, did not contend that the fees 
exceed in amount the reasonable cost of providing the protective services 
for which the fees are charged, or that the fees were levied for any unrelated 
revenue purpose.”32  In leaving open the question of whether the fees 
exceeded the reasonable cost of providing the protective services for the 
lower court to decide, the court implied that proportionality is a 
requirement of a valid fee.33  Regardless, Proposition 26 specifically requires 
proportionality between the fees assessed and the harm mitigated.  The fees 
may not exceed the “reasonable costs” associated with the specific benefit 
conferred.34  Neither the Court in Sinclair nor Proposition 26 defines what 
reasonable costs are.   
24. Id. at 874.
25. Id. at 877.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 878.
30. Prop. 26, Findings and Declarations of Purpose, § 1(e).
31. Sinclair, 15 Cal. 4th at 876 (emphasis in original).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Cal. Const., art. XIII A § 3(b)(1).
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B. The Stringent Proposition 26 Test for Fees
The effect of Proposition 26 is to narrow the Sinclair decision and its 
allowance of regulatory fees regardless of a whether the State confers a 
benefit or privilege on the payor.35  Proposition 26 expands the definition of 
a tax to include “any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by the 
State,” regardless of whether they generate revenue.36  It erases Sinclair’s 
distinction between a valid fee that raises revenue for a regulatory program 
and an invalid one that raises money for the general fund.37  Instead, it 
prohibits both types of fees unless there is a specific benefit conferred or 
privilege granted to the payor.38  The effect will most likely be that more 
regulatory fees will require a two-thirds super majority vote unless a specific 
benefit can be proven.39  
The Proposition does enumerate exceptions to the new definition of a 
tax.  The two exceptions that AB 32 fees could fall under include: 
(1) A specific government benefit conferred or privilege granted
directly to the regulated industry that is not provided to others
and that does not exceed the reasonable costs to the state of
conferring the benefit or granting the privilege to the regulated
industry.
(2) A specific government service or product provided directly to
the regulated industry that is not provided to others and that
similarly does not exceed the state’s costs of providing the
service or product to the industry.40
However, these exceptions appear to depart from the principle 
embraced in Sinclair: “fees may legitimately go beyond mere payments for 
government benefits received in order to defray the actual costs to 
communities from activities causing pollution, hazardous products, or other 
ills.”41 
Further, until the passage of Proposition 26, the general rule in 
California has been that courts usually defer to and review de novo any state 
and local government legislative findings on the amount of fees and 
assessments.42  However, the language of Proposition 26 switches the 
35. HOROWITZ ET AL., supra note 11, at 6.
36. Cal. Const. art. XIII A § 3(a).
37. Sinclair, 15 Cal. 4th at 880.
38. Cal. Const. art. XIII A § 3(b).
39. HOROWITZ ET AL., supra note 11, at 5.
40. Cal. Const. art. XIII A §§ 3(b)(1) and (2).
41. HOROWITZ ET AL., supra note 11, at 6.
42. See, e.g., Silicon Valley Taxpayers Ass’n, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cnty. Open
Space Auth., 44 Cal. 4th 431 (2008). 
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burden of proof to the State to show a fee is not a tax: 
The State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of 
evidence that a levy, charge, or other exaction is not a tax, that 
the amount is no more than necessary to cover the reasonable 
costs of the governmental activity, and that the manner in which 
those costs are allocated to a payor bear a fair or reasonable 
relationship to the payor’s burdens on, or benefits received from, 
the governmental activity.43 
The outcome of this burden switching will most likely be courts 
showing little deference to findings by state and local governments because 
“all government fees, charges, and exactions would begin in court with a 
presumption of invalidity.”44  If a regulatory fee is challenged, the 
government now must prove a specific benefit conferred and the 
proportionality of the fee to the allegedly mitigated harm.  
III. The Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 and the
Aftermath of Proposition 26
A. The Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006
On September 27, 2006, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed into 
law the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006.45  AB 32 authorizes CARB to 
establish and oversee a “comprehensive program of regulatory and market 
mechanisms to achieve real, quantifiable, and cost effective reductions of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.”46  The ultimate goal of AB 32 is to reduce 
GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.47  Achieving this goal requires a 
fifteen-percent reduction from current levels of GHG emissions, which is 
“approximately a [thirty]-percent reduction from where California would be 
in 2020 under a business-as-usual scenario with nothing done to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.”48  The scoping plan, adopted by CARB in 2008, 
establishes the framework for achieving the 2020 targets.49  The 2010-2011 
California State Budget authorizes $35.2 million in expenditures for AB 32 
43. Cal. Const. art. XIII C § 1(e)(7).
44. HOROWITZ ET AL., supra note 11, at 5.
45. AB 32 Cost of Implementation Fee Regulation Fact Sheet, Cal. Air Resources
Board, (April 8, 2011), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/adminfee/ab32coi_fee_fact_sheet.pdf. 
46. Id.
47. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38550.
48. Mary Nichols, California’s Climate Change Program: Lessons for the Nation, 27
UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 185, 199-200, 2009. 
49. Climate Change Scoping Plan, Cal. Air Resources Board, (Dec. 2008),
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/appendices_volume1.pdf. 
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implementation measures, created by the scoping plan.50  However, the 
costs are offset by fees paid by GHG emissions sources.51  Under AB 32, 
CARB has the authority to adopt a schedule of fees and impose them on 
GHG emitters pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 38597, which 
states: 
The State board may adopt by regulation, after a public 
workshop, a schedule of fees to be paid by sources of GHG 
emissions regulated pursuant to this division, consistent with 
Section 57001.  The revenues collected pursuant to this section 
shall be deposited in the Air Pollution Control Fund and are 
available upon appropriation, by the Legislature, for purposes of 
carrying out this division.52 
The AB 32 Cost of Implementation Fee Regulation (“COI Regulation”) 
became effective on July 19, 2010 after being adopted by CARB, following a 
public hearing and further approval from the Office of Administrative Law.53  
The COI Regulation identifies approximately 285 fee payers including large 
natural gas distributors; refineries; suppliers and importers of gasoline and 
diesel fuel; electricity importers and in-state generating facilities; facilities 
that combust coal and petroleum coke; and cement manufacturers.54  CARB 
calculates each emitter’s Common Carbon Cost (“CCC”), which includes the 
total required revenue for AB 32 implementation divided by the total 
applicable statewide emissions for each business or facility based on 
reported emissions and fuel data.55  CARB began sending invoices for 
payment in March 2011 and in subsequent years emitters will be notified of 
their fees approximately 30 days after the fiscal year’s budget has been 
signed by the governor.56  
B. AB 32 and the Retroactivity Question
The strongest argument that Proposition 26 would not affect 
continuing AB 32 implementation and funding is that AB 32 is already 
codified in statute.  This interpretation means fees CARB chooses to 
implement will be protected from Proposition 26 under the umbrella of its 
administrative discretion.  Looking at the language of the Proposition, it 
specifically requires a change in statutory language for a fee to be subject to 
50. AB 32, supra note 45.
51. Id.
52. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38597.
53. AB 32, supra note 45.
54. Id.
55. Calculation of the Fiscal Year 2010-2011 Common Carbon Cost, Cal. Air Resources
Board, (June 21, 2011), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/adminfee/commoncarbon.htm. 
56. AB 32, supra note 45
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the two-thirds vote requirement.  “Any changes in state statute which results in any 
taxpayer paying a higher tax must be imposed by an act passed by not less than 
two-thirds of all members elected to each of the two houses of the 
Legislature.”57  While AB 32 implementation is ongoing, CARB’s authority to 
impose fees on polluters “will not require any changes in state statute.”58  
However, AB 32 fees depend on the change in state statute that 
occurred with AB 32’s original passage.  There is nothing in the language 
Proposition 26 that explicitly requires the change in state statute to occur 
after, as opposed to before, Proposition 26’s own passage.59  There is an 
argument that any regulation that is adopted after Proposition 26’s passage 
that results from a change in state statute (no matter when that statutory 
change occurred) is subject to Proposition 26 constraints.  Consequently, 
the key date from this perspective is the date of adoption of the regulation 
that imposes a fee.  In the case of AB 32, CARB adopted the fees in 2009, 
however they were not approved by the Office of Administrative Law until 
June 17, 2010, and became effective on July 19, 2010.60  Therefore, the 
question becomes can Proposition 26 apply to new fees that result from 
changes in state statute that occurred before the proposition was passed if 
the actual fee is adopted after Proposition 26 passage?  To answer this 
question, it is crucial to look at how California Courts have interpreted 
retroactive applications of a ballot measure.   
C. California’s Presumption Against Applying Ballot
Measures Retroactively
There is a strong presumption against applying ballot measures 
retroactively.  California courts adhere to any express retroactivity provisions 
and will look to extrinsic evidence that the Legislature or the voters must 
have intended a retroactive application.61  Russell v. Superior Court and 
Envangelatos v. Superior Court both spoke on the issue of retroactively applying 
Proposition 51.62  The measure eliminated joint and several liability for 
noneconomic damages, and replaced it with several liability where the 
“tortfeasor would be liable only for a percentage of a plaintiff’s noneconomic 
damages, in proportion to the tortfeasor’s actual responsibility for the 
57. Cal. Const. art. XIII A § 3(a) (emphasis in original).
58. Eberhard, supra note 17.
59. Cal. Const., art. XIII A § 3(a).
60. AB 32 Cost of Implementation Fee Regulation, Cal. Air Resources Board (Sept. 1,
2011) http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/adminfee/adminfee.htm. 
61. Evangelatos v. Superior Ct., 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1193-94 (1988).  In applying non-
retroactivity for Proposition 51 the court ruled “It is a widely recognized legal 
principle … that in absence of a clear legislative intent to the contrary, statutory 
enactments apply prospectively.” 
62. Id.; Russell v. Superior Ct., 185 Cal. App. 3d. 810 (1986).
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injury.”63  Plaintiffs in both Russell and Envangelatos were awaiting trial when 
the measure passed and it was applied retroactively and limited the amount 
of damages they were awarded.64  
Russell held Proposition 51 could not be applied retroactively because 
it did not contain an express provision for retroactivity.65  Nothing in the 
initiative’s wording suggested retroactive intent because the operative 
language and the ballot arguments and analysis were ambiguously worded 
or in the future tense.66  Following Russell, in Evangelatos, the California 
Supreme Court had the final word when it held the measure did not apply 
retroactively because there was nothing in the Legislative Analyst’s analysis 
or any of the statements of the proponents or opponents in the ballot 
pamphlet that spoke to the retroactivity question.67  
More recently, the California Supreme Court held that Proposition 8 
could not be applied retroactively.68  The effect would have been to nullify 
the marriages of same-sex couples that had occurred between the 
legalization of such marriages following the decision in the In re Marriage 
Cases69 and the passage of the proposition which specifically stated “only 
marriage between man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”70  
The court ruled that there was no clear evidence that the measure was 
intended to apply retroactively because there was no express retroactivity 
clause and the language of the measure was in present tense.71   
Proposition 26 does have a specific retroactive provision, however it 
only goes back to January 2010: 
Any tax adopted after January 1, 2010, but prior to the effective 
date of this act, that was not adopted in compliance with the 
requirements of this section is void 12 months after the effective 
date of this act unless the tax is reenacted by the Legislature and 
signed into law by the Governor in compliance requirements of 
this section.72  
This suggests that the measure should not be applied to any actions 
prior to January 1, 2010.  Further, there is nothing in the voter guide that 
63. Id.  
64. Id.
65. Russell v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 3d. at 814.  (1986).
66. Id.
67. Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1212.
68. Strauss v. Horton, 46 Cal. 4th 364 (2009).
69. In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757 (2008).
70. Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th at 471.
71. Id.
72. Cal. Const., art. XIII A § 3(c).
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suggests it is to be applied to any changes in statute before that date.73  
Additionally, the defeat of Proposition 23 expresses intent by the voters that 
AB 32 not be suspended or hindered in its implementation.74   
However, it should also be noted that cases regarding retroactive 
application of ballot measures involve instances where specific substantive 
or procedural rights under the due process clause were at stake and where 
“retroactive application of a new measure may conflict with constitutional 
principles ‘if it deprives a person of a vested right without due process of 
law.’”75  There is not a case that speaks directly to applying fees retroactively. 
This will be up for the courts to decide.  
D. Divining Vague Ballot Language
While the likely interpretation is that Proposition 26 does not apply 
retroactively to AB 32, there could be some controversy in determining the 
tense of “any change in state statute” and when to begin measuring that 
from.  If the phrase is interpreted to mean any change in state statute, 
regardless if it occurred before or after the passage of the proposition, it 
could follow that any fees resulting from that change in statute could fall 
under the Proposition 26 umbrella.  To gain some insight into what the likely 
outcome might be, it is revealing to explore how California courts interpret 
vague ballot language.   
First, courts will look at the plain and generally accepted meaning of 
the word in question.76  Courts will often look at the word within the context 
used and the words surrounding it.77  However, if there is any ambiguity, as 
there could be with Proposition 26, courts look to the intentions of the 
ballot measure.78  Ballot summaries, arguments, and analyses presented to 
the voters in the ballot pamphlet are accepted as construction aids to divine 
the meaning of uncertain language.”79  Here, the arguments by proponents 
of Proposition 26 and the analysis by the Legislative Analyst’s Office (“LAO”) 
73. See California Statewide General Election Voter Information Guide (Nov. 2,
2010), Arguments and Rebuttals of Proposition 26, http://www.voterguide. 
sos.ca.gov/propositions/26/arguments-rebuttals.htm. 
74. Eberhard, supra note 17.  See also Jonathan Zasloff, Does Proposition 26
Undermine California’s Climate Change Law? (Nov. 4, 2010), http://legalplanet. 
wordpress.com/2010/11/04/does-proposition-26-undermine-californias-climate 
change-law/. 
75. Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th at 473 (quoting In re Marriage of Buol (1985) 39 Cal. 3d.
751, 756). 
76. Stephen Salvucci, Say What You Mean And Mean What You Say: The
Interpretation Of Initiatives In California, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 871, 875 (1998). 
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 882 (citing Board of Supervisors v. Lonergan, (1980) 27 Cal. 3d 855).
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are illuminating.  
The ballot title and summary are written in the present tense.  The 
ballot title reads: “Requires that certain state and local fees be approved by 
two-thirds vote.  Fees include those that address adverse impacts on society 
or the environment caused by the fee-payer’s business.”80  This seems to 
suggest that the drafters did not intend it to include any changes in state 
statute that occurred before the passage of Proposition 26.  Additionally, 
there is no mention in the LAO analysis that this measure would apply 
retroactively.81  The analysis points out specific fees that might be in danger 
and would require a revote, including the recent fuel tax law; however, it fails 
to make any mention of AB 32 and its continuing implementation.82   
Nevertheless, there is some vague language in the LAO interpretation 
that could be troublesome for AB 32:83 “Because this measure could repeal 
laws after this analysis was prepared and some of the measure’s provisions 
would be subject to future interpretation by the courts, we cannot estimate 
the full fiscal effect of this repeal provision.”84  This vague and open ended 
statement about the fiscal effect of Proposition 26 suggests the retroactivity 
provision of the measure will have to be analyzed by courts to see what laws 
it applies to.  Additionally, the LAO analysis suggests the measure is 
targeted towards any regulatory fee that has relatively diffuse benefits: 
“[g]enerally, the types of fees and charges that would become taxes under 
the measure are ones that government imposes to address health, 
environmental, or other societal or economic concerns.”85  AB 32 does not 
create fees that benefit emitters, but rather the public at large, perhaps 
putting it in the crosshairs of Proposition 26.   
However, the arguments by the proponents of the initiative in the voter 
guide suggest that Proposition 26 is not meant to affect already adopted 
regulatory programs.  The proponents argue that “Proposition 26 preserves 
those laws and protects legitimate fees such as those to clean up 
environmental . . . damage.”86  The rebuttal against the opponents’ 
arguments states: “Prop. 26 protects legitimate fees and won’t eliminate or 
80. California Statewide General Election Voter Information Guide (Nov. 2,
2010), Title and Summary of Proposition 26, http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/ 
propositions/26/title-summary.htm. 
81. California Statewide General Election Voter Information Guide (Nov. 2,
2010), Analysis of Proposition 26 by Legislative Analyst, http://www.voterguide 
.sos.ca.gov/propositions/26/analysis.htm. 
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. California Statewide General Election Voter Information Guide (Nov. 2,
2010), Arguments and Rebuttals of Proposition 26, http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/ 
propositions/26/arguments-rebuttals.htm. 
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phase out any of California’s environmental or consumer protection laws.”87  
However, while the ballot arguments in favor of the measure list several of 
the laws that will be protected, including the California Clean Air Act, there 
is no mention of AB 32 specifically.88  Nonetheless, it is unlikely that an 
omission can be interpreted as a direct intent toward retroactivity.   
There is no doubt there will be court challenges to AB 32 attempting to 
argue that it should fall under the umbrella of Proposition 26.  However, it is 
unlikely that California courts will apply the measure retroactively.  The 
express retroactivity clause in the measure along with the largely present 
tense language in the ballot title, arguments, and analysis, do not show a 
conclusive retroactive intent. 
E. Does Proposition 26 Apply to Pre-Proposition 26 Fees
When They Are Adjusted?
Perhaps most destructive for AB 32, Proposition 26 could require a 
two-thirds legislative approval for any adjustments to the fees assessed. 
This depends on whether the language “tax means any levy, charge or 
exaction of any kind imposed by the state” is interpreted to mean any 
adjustment to existing fees.  If this is the valid interpretation, in the long run 
CARB could find itself “hamstrung in its ability to raise existing fees in order 
to keep up with changing needs, inflation, or other factors.”89  
Foreshadowing this issue, LAO analysis of the measure finds it unlikely 
current fees will be affected unless they are later increased or extended.90 
The California League of Cities (“League”) believes in the local context, 
most likely Proposition 26 does not require reapproval by the legislature for 
adjustments for inflation of levies “if the formula or schedule for changes 
was approved before the measure’s effective date.”91  Under the League’s 
reading, in the local fee context, Proposition 26 is an amendment to article 
XIIIC92 (originally passed as Proposition 218) and the Proposition 218 
Omnibus Implementation Act’s definitions applies to its language.93  The 
League argues the Omnibus Act is helpful in interpreting Proposition 26’s 
language because Proposition 26 is a narrow amendment to art. XIIIC.94  This 
is evidence of an intent that the terms of the Omnibus Act apply under the 
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Horowtiz et al, supra note 11, at 9.
90. Ballot Pamp., supra note 80 at 58.
91. California League of Cities, Proposition 26 Implementation Guide, http://www.
cacities.org/Prop26Guide 
92. Cal. Const. art. XIII § C.
93. See Cal. Gov. Code § 53750.
94. California League of Cities, supra note 91 at 8.
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statutory construction theory “in pari material”95 — “statutes which relate to 
the same general subject matter must be read and construed together, as 
one act, each referring and supplementing the other, though they were 
passed at different times.”96  “Thus, terms used in Proposition 26 that are 
also defined in the Omnibus Act will be subject to the already existing 
meanings provided in the Omnibus Act.”97  The Omnibus Act states that a: 
tax, fee, or charge is not deemed to be ‘increased’ by an agency 
action that . . . [adjusts] the amount of a tax or fee or charge in 
accordance with a schedule of adjustments, including a clearly 
defined formula for inflation adjustment that was adopted by the 
agency prior to November 6, 1996.98 
Thus, the League argues that increasing a fee according to a schedule 
of adjustments included in the act prior to the passage of Proposition 26 
“should not constitute an increase that requires voter approval.”99 
However, no such definitions exist for the statewide fee language 
Proposition 26 amends.  Therefore, while local fees might be protected from 
Proposition 26’s bite, statewide regulatory programs such as AB 32 could 
face a challenge if CARB decides to adjust existing fees.  As a result, it is 
crucial to determine if AB 32 regulatory fees fit one of the exceptions to 
Proposition 26.  Regardless, any exception will still require fees to be 
reasonable in light of the harm mitigated, so it is important to analyze what 
standard courts have applied to determining the proportionality of fees.   
IV. Proportionality of the AB 32 Fees
A. Does AB 32 Qualify for Any of the Exceptions Under
Proposition 26?
Whether or not courts rule on the retroactivity questions, Proposition 
26 will only validate future regulatory fee programs that are a “charge 
imposed for a specific benefit or privilege granted directly to the payor that 
is not provided to those not charged, and which does not exceed the 
reasonable costs to the State of conferring the benefit or granting the 
privilege to the payor.”100   
Most likely there are two parts of AB 32 that can satisfy this exception. 
First, and probably the strongest case, there is Health and Safety Code 
95. Id.
96. Id. (quoting In re Wright’s Estate, (1929) 98 Cal. App. 633, 635).
97. Id.
98. Cal. Gov. Code Code § 53750(h)(2)(A).
99. California League of Cities, supra note 91 at 8.
100. Cal. Const., art. XIII A § 3(b)(1).
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38597, which provides that:  
The [California Air Resources Board (“CARB”)] may adopt by 
regulation, after a public workshop, a schedule of fees to be paid 
by the sources of greenhouse gas emissions regulated pursuant 
to this division . . .101  
The Board has issued regulations imposing fees upon approximately 
285 emitters102 of especially problematic gases.103  There is no easy equitable 
alternative that emitters could replace the gases they are emitting with and 
it is therefore arguably a privilege for a business to be able to use such 
destructive gases for a small fee.104  
CARB can also impose fees under its authority granted by Section 
38570, which states: “The state board may include in the regulations 
adopted pursuant to Section 38562 the use of market-based compliance 
mechanisms to comply with the regulations.”105 Under 38505(k)(2), a 
“market-based compliance mechanism” may include: “Greenhouse gas 
emissions exchanges, banking, credits, and other transactions, governed by 
rules and protocols established by the state board . . .”106  Charging some 
entities for allowances to emit greenhouse gases seems consistent with this 
mandate;107 not being given a credit or being forced to buy one is essentially 
a fee.108  CARB would “seem to have the authority under AB 32 to impose 
fees of this type” and this appears “consistent with Proposition 26 because 
emitters are allowed to voluntarily change their behavior in order to reduce 
the amount of the fee.”109  Additionally, CARB’s power to penalize emitters 
who do not comply with its regulations110 remains unaffected by Proposition 
26 “because the measure explicitly excludes fines or penalties from its 
ambit.”111 
101. AB 32, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38597 (2006).
102. AB 32, supra note 45
103. AB 32 Scoping Plan, supra note 49 at C189, “These gases have potent
global warming potentials and an upstream fee would ensure that the climate impact 
of these substances is incorporated into their price, encouraging emission 
reductions and the development of alternatives. 
104. Darien Shanske, Going Forward by Going Backward to Benefit Taxes, 3(2) Cal. J.
Pol. & Pol’y 1 (2011). 
105. AB 32, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38570 (2006).
106. Id. at § 38505(k)(2) (2006).
107. See News Release, CARB, California Air Resources Board gives green light
to California’s emissions trading program, (Dec. 16, 2010) available at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/newsrelease.php?id=170. 
108. Shanske, supra note 104, at 10.
109. Id.
110. AB 32, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38580(b)(1) (2006).
111. Shanske, supra note 104, at 10, citing Cal. Const. art. XIII § A(3)(B)(5)
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B. California Cases Determining Proportionality of a Fee to
Harm Caused
If AB 32 fees fall into one of the exceptions under Proposition 26, to 
the extent that future fees “go beyond amounts necessary to compensate 
the state for benefits conferred on industry alone, those fees could potentially 
be reclassified as taxes under the Proposition 26 regime.”112  Therefore, it is 
important to look at how courts have interpreted reasonable costs for 
conferring a benefit.   
In California Building Industry Association et al., v. San Joaquin Valley Air 
Pollution Control District, the Fifth District Court of Appeal dealt with the 
question of whether there was a “nexus between the amount of the fee and 
the cost of the service for which the fee is charged.”113  The Legislature 
granted air pollution control districts the authority to adopt and implement 
regulations to reduce and mitigate emissions.114  The San Joaquin Valley Air 
Pollution Control District created a model to quantify any emissions 
attributed to a new development.115  The model also identified voluntary 
onsite reduction measures and if those measures did not reduce a certain 
percentage of emissions, the developer was required to pay a fee to the 
District for offsite emissions reductions programs.116  The fees were 
calculated based on historical and projected costs to achieve emissions 
reductions.117  
Appellants argued that the District “did not employ a valid method for 
creating the fees, did not estimate or compute the total costs of the indirect 
source review program, and does not have a basis for fairly apportioning the 
fees.”118  A computer model determined credits for onsite mitigation 
measures and a fee was charged based on a dollar-per-ton estimate of the 
cost for the District to reduce the emissions offsite that the developer did 
not mitigate onsite.119  The appellants argued that the fees were invalid 
because there was no estimate of how much the offsite emissions program 
would cost, just an estimate of how much revenue would be generated.120  
However, the court found that the District estimated the emission reduction 
costs of the offsite projects through analysis of past and future emission 
reduction projects and then the fees were charged in direct proportion to 
112. HOROWITZ ET AL., supra note 11, at 10 (emphasis in original).
113. 178 Cal. App. 4th 120, 132 (2009).
114. Id. at 129.
115. Id. at 136.
116. Id. at 128.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 125.
119. Id. at 132.
120. Id. at 135.
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emissions the developer chose not to mitigate onsite.121 
Similar to the legislative authority granted to CARB, the court found 
the legislature granted the District the authority to adopt and implement 
regulations to reduce emissions from area wide sources of pollution and 
therefore found it a quasi-legislative action.122  The court concluded the 
standard of review for agency decision-making was “arbitrary, capricious, 
entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or unlawfully or procedurally 
unfair.”123  The court stated that although an agency must adequately 
consider all relevant factors and have a rational connection between those 
factors and the choice made for affecting the intention of the statute, there 
is deference given in “technical matters requiring the assistance of experts 
and the study of scientific data.”124 
The court identified that a valid fee calculation method establishes a 
reasonable relationship between the fee charges and the burden the 
development poses.125  However, it also held that “whether the fees collected 
exceed the cost the cost of the regulatory program they are collected to 
support need not be proved on an individual basis.”126  In setting fees it is 
permissible for the agency to employ a flexible assessment within a broad 
range of reasonableness.127  The court stated “[c]ertainty is not required.  The 
record need only demonstrate a reasonable relationship, not an exact 
relationship, between the fees to be charged and the estimated cost of the 
program.”128  
In 2010, the Fourth District Court of Appeal weighed in on the standard 
for determining proportionality of a fee to a business’ contribution to the 
problem in Equilon Enterprise v. SBE.129  In its analysis, the court extended a 
deferential review to agency determination of proportionality.130   
The plaintiff, Equilon Enterprise, LLC, doing business as Shell Oil, 
sought a refund for the fees it paid pursuant to the Childhood Lead 
Poisoning Prevention Act of 1991 (the Act).131  The Act authorized the 
121. Id.
122. Id. at 129.
123. Id.
124. Id. (citing Western States Petroleum Assn. v. South Coast Air Quality Management
District, (2006) 36 Cal. App. 4th 1012, 1118). 
125. Id. at 133.
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing California Assn. of Prof. Scientists v. Department of Fish & Game, 79 Cal.
App. 4th 935, 948-49 (2000)). 
128. Id. at 134 (citing City of Dublin v. County of Alameda, (1993) 14 Cal. App. 4th
264, 283). 
129. 189 Cal. App. 4th 865 (2010).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 870.
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California Department of Public Health (“CDPH”) to impose fees on 
manufacturers and other entities, formerly and/or presently engaged in the 
stream of lead or lead containing products, or that can be identified as a 
significant source of environmental lead contamination to fund childhood 
lead poisoning prevention programs to reduce risk of exposure.132  The fees 
were imposed on three industries the department identified that historically 
or currently produce lead products that contribute to environmental 
contamination: paint distributors, motor vehicle distributors, and facilities 
releasing lead or lead compounds into the air in the state.133  CDPH 
determined how to allocate the fees between the paint and gasoline 
industries by looking at national lead consumption data that lists the 
annual tons of lead consumed in manufacturing paint and gasoline and 
adjusted it for California consumption rates.134  CDPH calculated the gas 
industry was responsible for eighty-five percent of lead consumption, with 
the paint industry consuming the other fifteen percent.135  Each gasoline 
distributor, including the plaintiff, was required to pay a proportional share 
of the industry’s total fee based on its estimated share of the total gallons of 
gasoline distributed.136 
Shell argued that in order for the fee to be constitutional under 
Proposition 13, “it must be proportional to the gasoline industry’s 
responsibility for cases of childhood lead poisoning, rather than 
proportional to the industry’s responsibility for environmental lead 
contamination.”137  From the gasoline industry’s perspective, making them 
responsible for providing eighty-five percent of the program’s funding was 
an invalid fee because they were not responsible for eighty-five percent of 
childhood lead poisoning.138  The trial court disagreed, finding that the 
legislative intent of the program addressed children’s exposure to lead 
contamination that could turn into lead poisoning, rather than just lead 
poisoning cases, and held that the fee was reasonably related.139  
Interestingly, and perhaps meaningful in light of the fact that Proposition 26 
changes the burden of proof to the government to show the fee is legitimate, 
the trial court also noted that, “even if the state has the burden of 
establishing that the fees bear a reasonable relationship to the fee payers 
burden on the regulatory activity, [the department] . . . met its burden in this 
case of showing the fees are reasonably related to the burden of 
132. Id. at 875.
133. Id. at 876.
134. Id. at 877.
135. Id. at 877-78.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 870.
138. Id. at 883.
139. Id. at 880.
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environmental lead contamination.”140  
On appeal the Fourth District agreed with the trial court’s reasoning. 
The court looked to precedent141 and found that it suggested a “flexible 
assessment of proportionality within a broad range of reasonableness in 
setting fees.”142  The court noted that “The legislative body charged with 
enacting laws pursuant to the police power retains the discretion to 
apportion the costs of regulatory programs in a variety of reasonable 
financing schemes.”143  The court specified that there must be a reasonable 
basis in the record for the cost allocation to the individual payers of the 
fee.144  The court found a reasonable basis for apportioning the fees in the 
record by looking at the intent of the Legislature and decided the program 
was implemented to address environmental lead contamination resulting in 
childhood exposure, and not just actual cases of poisoning.145 
More recently, the California Supreme Court addressed the 
proportionality question between the costs of regulation and the fees 
imposed in California Farm Bureau Federation v. State Water Resources Control 
Board.146  In this case, the State Water Resources Control Board (“SWRCB”) 
was required by statute to adopt a schedule of annual fees to be paid by 
permit and license holders to appropriate water source.147  Although the fees 
were purportedly intended to recover the cost of the SWRCB’s Water Rights 
Division water rights program,148 the statute also gave the SWRCB the 
authority to collect fees beyond the cost of implementing the permitting and 
license system.149  Additionally, the statute required the SWRCB to perform 
an annual review of the amount necessary to fund the regulatory activity, 
and to adjust the fees accordingly.150  The plaintiffs alleged that these fees 
were actually revenue generating taxes, and that passage of the statute 
should have required a two-thirds majority in the Legislature, pursuant to 
Proposition 13.151  Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that the fees imposed 
140. Id.
141. See e.g San Diego Gas & Elec.. Co. v. San Diego County Air Pollution
Control Dist., 203 Cal. App. 3d 1132 (1998).  
142. Equilon 189 Cal. App. 4th at 882 (quoting California Ass’n of Prof’l
Scientists v. Dep’t of Fish & Game, (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 935, 949). 
143. Id. at 882-83 (quoting California Ass’n of Prof’l Scientists, 79 Cal. App. 4th at
950). 
144. Id. at 883 (quoting California Ass’n of Prof’l Scientists, 79 Cal. App. 4th at 950).
145. Id. at 885-86.
146. 51 Cal. 4th 421 (2011).
147. Id. at 431.
148. Id. at 432.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 437.
 West  Northwest, Vol. 18, No. 1, Winter 2012 
58 
were disproportionate to the benefits conferred.152  
The court articulated the standard that a fee cannot exceed the 
reasonable cost of regulation to the point where the surplus is used for 
general revenue collection.153  Similar to California Building Association, the 
court recognized that the fee “need not be finely calibrated to the precise 
benefit each individual fee payor might derive.”154  The court found that the 
statute authorizing the SWRCB to collect the fees did not require the board 
to collect in excess of the administrative costs for carrying out the water 
rights program.155   
Additionally, the plaintiffs contended that the fees were 
unconstitutional as applied because they were unreasonably 
disproportionate.156  They argued that while the Division’s program benefited 
all water rights holders and the general public, only forty percent of rights 
holders were charged the entire cost of the program.157  The court found the 
record to be insufficient to resolve the issue of whether the fees, as 
imposed, were reasonably proportional to the costs of the regulatory 
program.158  The court remanded this issue to the trial court.159  
In general, California courts seem to support a flexible standard for 
apportioning fees, while deferring to the agency’s determination of each 
payer’s contribution to the harm a regulatory program purports to mitigate. 
However, to the extent that new fees go beyond the cost of funding the 
regulatory program, it seems likely they will be considered invalid under 
Proposition 26.   
V. Conclusion
In passing AB 32, California became a national leader in the fight
against climate change.  Voters showed their support for the legislation by 
coming out strongly against Proposition 23.  Contrary to the voters’ intent, it 
seems likely that Proposition 26 gives industries subject to AB 32 fees an 
avenue to mount a challenge against future fees.  Because a change in 
statute must occur to trigger Proposition 26, and AB 32’s statutory mandate 
occurred in 2006, it appears unlikely that Proposition 26 can be applied 
retroactively to nullify the climate change regulation.  However, to the extent 
that future fees appear to apply beyond the benefit conferred on industries, 
152. Id. at 440.
153. Id. at 438.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 438-40.
156. Id. at 440.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 442.
159. Id.
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it appears there is the potential they could be reclassified as taxes. 
Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, the burden of proving the 
fees are legitimate will now be on the government, which means that all new 
fees will be presumed invalid.  This will no doubt encourage challengers to 
bring suits to force the State to meet its burden of proof.  However, it does 
seem encouraging that California courts have usually deferred to agency 
determinations in calculating fees as long as there is a general 
reasonableness in the record to demonstrate proportionality.   
This fight will continue as the long-term impacts of Proposition 26 are 
played out in the courts.  Regardless of what happens, Proposition 26 
represents a radical shift away from the maxim that polluters should pay for 
regulatory programs that benefit the public at large. 
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